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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Introduction.
North Idaho Resorts, LLC (“NIR”) appeals the award of discretionary costs and costs as a

matter of right to Valiant Idaho, LLC (“Valiant”) in Bonner County Case No. CV-2009-1810
(“Valiant Foreclosure”). In a Memorandum Decision Order Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees to
Valiant Idaho, LLC (“Memorandum Awarding Costs”) and the subsequently entered Judgment
Re: Costs and Attorneys’ Fees, copies of which are attached and identified as Exhibit A
[R.Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5829-43 and pp. 5844-46, respectively], the district court awarded Valiant costs
against NIR in the total amount of $10,369.93. R.Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5829–46. This award is
comprised of 25% of the total discretionary costs awarded to Valiant (i.e., $32,464.70 x .25 =
$8,116.18) and 25% of the costs as a matter of right awarded to Valiant (i.e., $9,014.99 x .25 =
$2,253.75). Id. This award was satisfied at a sheriff’s sale held on November 15, 2016 by payment
in the full amount of the award plus interest and sheriff’s costs. R.Vol. LX, pp. 7411–12.
Although NIR did not object to Valiant’s Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys’ Fees
(“Valiant Fee Memo”) filed July 6, 2015, NIR now contends that the award of discretionary costs
was an abuse of discretion because the district court failed to: (1) perceive its award as a matter
of discretion; (2) establish that said costs were exceptional and should be awarded to Valiant in the
interest of justice; and (3) reach its determination through an exercise of reason. NIR’s arguments
are without merit and should be rejected.
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B.

Pertinent Facts And Procedural History.
1.

The Idaho Club.

The Valiant Foreclosure is an exceptionally complex real estate foreclosure lawsuit arising
out of a failed golf course and residential housing development project located in Sandpoint, Idaho
and commonly known as “The Idaho Club.” Valiant’s interests in The Idaho Club arise out of three
mortgages that were assigned to it by RE Loans, LLC (“RE Loans Mortgage”), Pensco Trust Co.
f/b/o Barney Ng (“Pensco Mortgage”) and Mortgage Fund ‘08, LLC (“MF08 Mortgage”)
(collectively, “Valiant Mortgages”). R.Vol. XXII, pp. 2562–66. NIR’s interest in The Idaho Club
arises out of a vendor’s lien (“Vendor’s Lien”) that it purportedly obtained by selling certain property
to Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC (“POBD”), the developer of The Idaho Club.
Id., pp. 2568–69; R.Vol. XXV, p. 2960.
2.

The Valiant Foreclosure.

The failure of the development spawned a multitude of interrelated civil lawsuits,
including the Valiant Foreclosure, and: (a) Sage Holdings LLC, et. al. v. Pend Oreille Bonner
Development, LLC, et. al. (Bonner County Case No. CV-2010-2142); (b) ACI Northwest, Inc. v.
Bar-K, Inc., et. al. (Bonner County Case No. CV 2010-2211); (c) Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v.
Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC, et. al. (Bonner County Case No. CV-2011-0135);
(d) The Idaho Club Homeowner’s Association, Inc. v. Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC,
et. al. (Bonner County Case No. CV-2011-2284); and (e) The State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation
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Board v. Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC, et. al. (Bonner County Case No. CV-2012-0008).
R.Vol. XLI, pp. 5021–23. Valiant and NIR were parties in each of these lawsuits.
The Valiant Foreclosure is by far the most complex of the lawsuits arising out of
The Idaho Club. It began as a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action filed October 13, 2009 by the
contractor who constructed the golf course. R.Vol. I, pp. 172–96. After two years of motion practice
and an almost two-year long bankruptcy stay1, Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice.
See R.Vol. II, pp. 275–83, pp. 284–89, pp. 325–29; R.Vol. III, pp. 374–77, pp. 383–85.
Motion practice

resumed

for

approximately

another

year

before

Valiant

filed

its

Counterclaim, Cross-claim and Third Party Complaint For Judicial Foreclosure on August 19, 2014
(“Valiant Cross-claim”) and the case morphed into the judicial foreclosure of the Valiant Mortgages.
R.Vol. VI, pp. 739–66; R.Vol. X, pp. 1164–67.
The Valiant Cross-Claim sought an adjudication that Valiant’s interests, vis a vis the
Valiant Mortgages, were prior in right, title and interest to any interest claimed by no less than
twenty-eight (28) other persons or entities named as a counter-defendant, cross-defendant or
third-party defendant. R.Vol. VI, pp. 741–45. Valiant obtained default judgments or reached
stipulations as to Valiant’s priority with the counter-defendant and all but two cross-defendants.

1

The first bankruptcy stay was entered on September 29, 2011 and the second bankruptcy stay was lifted on
August 12, 2013. R.Vol. II, pp. 275–89; R.Vol. III, pp. 374–77. As such, a bankruptcy stay was in effect for
1 year, 10 months and 15 days.
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Valiant prevailed on summary judgment against NIR. Lastly, Valiant prevailed at trial against the
other remaining cross-defendant (JV L.L.C. [“JV”]) and third-party defendant (VP, Incorporated
[“VP”]).
3.

Subordination of NIR’s Alleged Vendor’s Lien.

On January 20, 2015, Valiant filed its Motion For Summary Judgment Against JV,
NIR and VP (“Valiant SJ”).

R.Vols. XIV–XVII, pp. 1720–2069.

The Valiant SJ sought

adjudication as a matter of law that the Valiant Mortgages were prior in right, title and interest to any
interest possessed by NIR. R.Vol. XIV, p. 1741. On April 14, 2015, the district court granted
Valiant’s SJ Motion. R.Vol. XXII, p. 2560.
NIR’s appeal does not challenge the propriety of the district court’s memorandum decision
granting the Valiant SJ. Id., pp. 2560–78. The district court ruled that NIR’s alleged Vendor’s Lien
was subordinate to Valiant’s first-priority mortgage (i.e., the RE Loans Mortgage) because
“NIR executed and recorded a Subordination Agreement, which subordinated any interest NIR had in
the Idaho Club Property to the 2007 RE Loans Mortgage.” Id., p. 2573. The district court further
ruled that NIR’s alleged Vendor’s Lien was subordinate to Valiant’s second-priority and
third-priority mortgages (i.e., the Pensco Mortgage and the MF08 Mortgage) because
“the Partial Termination recorded on March 15, 2007, and re-recorded on March 11, 2009,
terminated the Memorandum of Sale [i.e., the Vendor’s Lien] as to the property encumbered by the
Pensco Mortgage and MF08 Mortgage.” Id. Moreover, the district court noted that another
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district court (in Bonner County Case No. CV 2011-0135) had already determined that NIR’s
Vendor’s Lien “was paid in full and had no value.” Id., p. 2573, fn. 3.
On June 16, 2015, NIR filed a Renewed Motion For Reconsideration and Consideration
(“Renewed Motion”). R.Vol. XXIV, p. 2781. On July 21, 2015, the district court denied NIR’s
Renewed Motion and reiterated that “the vendor’s lien that Judge Griffin held to have no force and
effect because it was paid in full is the same vendor’s lien relied upon by NIR in this case.
Thus . . . NIR is collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of the alleged vendor’s lien.”
Id., pp. 2872–73. NIR’s appeal does not contest the propriety of the district court’s memorandum
decision denying NIR’s Renewed Motion. Id., pp. 2871–73.
On August 19, 2015, NIR filed its second motion to reconsider. R.Vol. XXVII, p. 3114.
On October 30, 2015, the district court, inter alia, denied this motion in its entirety. R.Vol. XXXIII,
pp. 4000–19. NIR did not appeal the district court’s decision.
4.

The Valiant Foreclosure Was Factually and Legally Complex.

As this Court is aware, most judicial foreclosures are straight forward and involve one
property owner and one lender seeking to foreclose its mortgage against a single parcel of
real property. Other judicial foreclosures are more complex; involving multiple lienholders and/or
multiple parcels of real property. The more lienholders and parcels of real property that are involved,
the more complex the judicial foreclosure becomes. The Valiant Foreclosure involved no less than
twenty-nine (29) parties, including Valiant, asserting liens against The Idaho Club. R.Vol. VI,
pp. 741–45. Moreover, one hundred fifty-six (156) parcels of real property are subject to some or all
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of the Valiant Mortgages.

R.Vol. XLIV, pp. 5317–5412; R.Vol. XLV, pp. 5413–5502.

Thus, the Valiant Foreclosure is unusually complex just from this standpoint.
The Valiant Foreclosure is made even more complex because the Valiant Mortgages did not
describe the same properties. Id. Accordingly, Valiant had to establish which parcels were subject
to each of the Valiant Mortgages. Id. As set forth in the Judgment and the Decree of Foreclosure,
certain parcels were subject to only one of the mortgages, other parcels were subject to two of
the mortgages, and still other parcels were subject to all three of the Valiant Mortgages. Id.
The motion practice in this case was also exceptionally complex. Valiant prevailed on a total
of five different dispositive motions, including its SJ Motion against NIR. See R.Vol. IV, p. 488;
R.Vol. V, pp. 636–42; R.Vol. V, pp. 647–52; R.Vol. XXII, pp. 2560–78; R.Vol. XXIV, pp. 2791–98;
R.Vol. XXXII, pp. 4000–19. Even though Valiant prevailed on all of its dispositive motions,
NIR, VP and JV refused to accept certain of the district court’s determinations. NIR, VP and JV
collectively filed no less than six (6) motions to reconsider. See R.Vol. XXII, p. 2596; R.Vol. XXIV,
p. 2781; R.Vol. XXVII, p. 3114; R.Vol. XXII, p. 2579; R.Vol. XXV, p. 2967; R. Vol. XXIX,
p. 3386. Valiant prevailed in whole or in part on all of these motions, including the three (3) motions
to reconsider filed jointly by NIR and VP.

See R.Vol. XXIV, pp. 2856–79; R.Vol. XXX,

pp. 3527-32; R.Vol. XXXII, pp. 4000–19. NIR did not prevail on any aspect of any of its motions
to reconsider. Id.
Valiant’s claims against NIR were decided on summary judgment. Id. However, certain of
Valiant’s claims against VP and JV had to be decided at trial. Valiant prevailed at the bi-furcated
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four (4) day trial. R.Vol. XXXVII, pp. 4589–4618. Ultimately, Valiant was awarded a judgment
against POBD in the total amount of $21,485,212.26.

R.Vol. XLV, pp. 5413–16.

The Valiant Mortgages were adjudicated to be prior in right, title and interest to any interest
possessed by the counter-defendant, cross-defendants, and third-party defendant in this case,
including NIR. Id. The district court entered the Decree of Foreclosure entitling Valiant to sell
one hundred fifty-six (156) parcels of real property subject to the Valiant Mortgages at a
sheriff’s sale to pay the judgment amounts. R.Vol. XLIV, pp. 5317–5412.
On July 6, 2015, Valiant filed its Fee Memo. R.Vol. XLI, pp. 5019–57. NIR did not file an
objection to the Valiant Fee Memo. The district court awarded Valiant costs and attorneys’ fees
against: (a) POBD in the amount of $731,275.48; (b) NIR in the amount of $10,369.93; (c) JV in the
amount of $15,554.88; and (d) VP in the amount of $15,554.88. Valiant also filed a motion for
sanctions against NIR, VP and JV, which was denied. R.Vol. XLVII, pp. 5770–86.
II.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
None.
III.
ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL
Valiant requests attorneys’ fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121 and the corresponding
procedural mechanism, Idaho Appellate Rule 41, because NIR’s appeal was brought frivolously,
unreasonably and without foundation. Additional argument concerning Valiant’s request for
attorneys’ fees is set forth hereinbelow Section IV.D.
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IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

Standard Of Review.
The Idaho Supreme Court has long held that the grant or denial of discretionary costs is

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will only be reviewed by an appellate court
for an abuse of that discretion. Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493, 960 P.2d 175, 176 (1998).
In reviewing whether a district court abused its discretion in awarding discretionary costs,
the appellate court reviews:
(1) Whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as
discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries
of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards; and
(3) whether the trial court reached its decision through an exercise
of reason.
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 313, 109 P.3d 161, 167 (2005), overruled on
other grounds by Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 152 Idaho 495, 497, 272 P.3d 467,
469 (2012). A trial court may award discretionary costs to the prevailing party where there has been
“a showing that the costs are necessary and exceptional, reasonably incurred, and should in the
interests of justice be assessed against the adverse party.” Id. at 314, 109 P.3d at 168. The party
opposing an award of discretionary costs bears the burden of demonstrating there was an abuse of
discretion by the district court. Id.
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B.

The District Court’s Award Of Discretionary Costs Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion.
NIR asserts that the district court’s award of discretionary costs in favor of Valiant was an

abuse of discretion. As NIR has failed to meet its burden of proof, its arguments should be rejected
and the district court’s decision should be upheld.
1.

NIR Did Not Object to the Valiant Fee Memo.

Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires the party objecting to a
memorandum of costs to file an objection within fourteen (14) days of the date of service. Id.
Moreover, “failure to timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs constitutes a waiver of
all objections to the costs claimed.” Id. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld this strict requirement in
Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 475–76, 36 P.3d 218,
227–28 (2001).
The respondent in Great Plains filed its memorandum of costs on June 3, 1999,
upon remittitur issued by this Court. Id. at 469–70, 36 P.3d at 221–22. The hearing on any
objections to the memorandum of costs was set for September 7, 1999. The appellant filed its
objection on the date of the hearing and filed its brief and supplemental authorities supporting its
objections after the hearing. Id. The district court awarded respondent attorneys’ fees, costs as a
matter of right, and discretionary costs.

Id.

The appellant appealed this decision to the

Idaho Supreme Court, which upheld the award of fees and costs ruling that the appellant had waived
any objections to the respondent’s memorandum of costs by failing to timely object as required by
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 475–76, 36 P.3d at 227–28.
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Valiant filed the Valiant Fee Memo on July 6, 2015. R.Vol. XLI, p. 5019. The Valiant
Fee Memo specifically requested an award of discretionary costs against NIR. Id. at 5052–55.
Although JV and VP filed objections, NIR did not. See R.Vol. XLIV, p. 5306 and R.Vol. XLV,
p. 5503. As such, NIR waived any objection that it may have had to an award of discretionary costs
in favor of Valiant. The district court’s award of discretionary costs should be upheld.
In the interest of full disclosure, it is worth noting that NIR and VP were represented by the
same counsel; thus, it could be argued that VP’s objection to the award of discretionary costs should
also apply to NIR. However, Rule 54(d)(5) is clear: “Failure to timely object to the items in the
memorandum of costs constitutes a waiver of all objections to the costs claimed.” I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5).
This Court has enforced the strict time requirements imposed by the rules notwithstanding a party’s
ignorance or misinterpretation thereof. See Harrison v. Bd. of Prof’l Discipline, 145 Idaho 179, 183,
177 P.3d 393, 397 (2008) (“Considering the circumstances of this case, ignorance or
misinterpretation of the rules’ requirements based on a mistaken and narrow reading . . . is not
good cause . . . for their failure to comply with the timely service requirement of I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2).”);
Sammis v. MagneTek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 348, 941 P.2d 314, 320 (1997).
2.

The District Court’s Award of Discretionary Costs Was Appropriate.

Even if NIR’s objection to Valiant’s Fee Memo had been timely, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it awarded Valiant $8,116.18 in discretionary costs. R.Vol. XLVIII,
pp. 5844–46. NIR bears the burden of establishing that the award was an abuse of discretion.
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 313, 109 P.3d 161, 167 (2005), overruled on
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other grounds by Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 152 Idaho 495, 497, 272 P.3d 467,
469 (2012). To establish an abuse of discretion, NIR must show: (a) the district court failed to
recognize that an award of discretionary costs was discretionary; (b) the district court did not act
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards; or
(c) the district court did not reach its decision through an exercise of reason. Id. NIR cannot meet its
burden of proof.
a.

The District Court Understood Its Award Was Discretionary.

NIR contends that the district court failed to perceive its award of discretionary costs to
Valiant as discretionary. Valiant does not dispute that it would constitute an abuse of discretion if
the district court failed to recognize that its decision was discretionary. Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist.
v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 313, 109 P.3d at 167. However, the district court clearly understood that its
award of “discretionary costs” was discretionary in this case.
The language that the district court utilized in its Memorandum Awarding Costs
demonstrates that it recognized the award of discretionary costs to Valiant as discretionary.
The district court ruled that it was “authorized” to award certain discretionary costs under the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

R.Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5838–39.

Moreover, the district court

specifically analyzed and determined that certain discretionary costs were “necessary and
exceptional, reasonably incurred and should in the interest of justice be awarded against [NIR].” Id.
at 5840–41 (emphasis added). At no time did the district court indicate that it perceived the award of
these costs was mandatory. To the contrary, Judge Buchanan repeatedly referred to these costs as
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“discretionary costs” throughout her Memorandum Awarding Costs. The district court understood
that its award to Valiant was discretionary. NIR’s contention that the district court did not perceive
this issue as a matter of discretion should be rejected.
b.

The District Court Acted Within the Boundaries of Its Discretion and
Consistent With Applicable Legal Standards.
i.

The District Court Acted Within the Boundaries of Its Discretion.

A trial court abuses its discretion if it exceeds the limits of its discretion or acts in a manner
inconsistent with applicable Idaho law. Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 313,
109 P.3d at 167. A court “must make express findings as to why a party’s discretionary costs should
or should not be allowed.” Id. at 314, 109 P.3d at 168. However, “[e]xpress findings as to the
general character of requested costs and whether such costs are necessary, reasonable, exceptional,
and in the interests of justice is sufficient to comply with this requirement.” Id. Moreover,
the Idaho Supreme Court “has always construed the requirement that a cost be ‘exceptional’ under
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) to include those costs incurred because the nature of the case was
itself exceptional.” Id.
NIR asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to make any showing that
the costs were exceptional and should, in the interests of justice, be assessed against NIR.
Contrary to NIR’s contention, the district court made express findings as to the general character of
each item of discretionary cost that it awarded and explained whether said costs were necessary,
reasonable, exceptional and should be awarded in the interests of justice.

R.Vol. XLVII,

pp. 5839-41.
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The district court held that “the scope and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary
and exceptional costs which Valiant should be awarded in the interest of justice.” Id., p. 5839.
The district court further identified within a table items of discretionary costs that Valiant had
requested and explained its determination that these items were “necessary and exceptional,
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against defendants,”
including NIR. Id., pp. 5840–41. The district court’s Memorandum Awarding Costs complied with
the requirement that it make express findings as to the general character of requested costs and
whether such costs met the requirements of Rule 54(d)(1)(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168. As such, NIR’ arguments
regarding the district court’s award of discretionary costs should be rejected.
ii.

The Award of Discretionary Costs Is Consistent With Applicable
Legal Standards.

The Idaho Supreme Court “has always construed the requirement that a cost be
exceptional . . . to include those costs incurred because the nature of the case was itself exceptional.”
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168. The determination of
whether a particular case or even an individual cost is “exceptional” must be made by assessing
“the context and nature of a case as a whole along with multiple circumstances.” Hoagland v.
Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900, 914, 303 P.3d 587, 601 (2013). Factors that may be considered include,
but are not limited to: the length and complexity of the litigation;2 whether the payment of certain

2

Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 169–70, 158 P.3d 937, 945–46 (2007).
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costs could otherwise prohibit legitimate claims from being pursued;3 “whether there was an
unnecessary waste of time, the frivolity of the issues presented, and creation of unnecessary costs that
could have been easily avoided”; 4 and whether the conduct of one or more parties made the litigation
exceptional or caused an exceptional amount of costs to be incurred.5
The district court determined that certain costs incurred by Valiant were necessary and
exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and that they should, in the interest of justice, be assessed
against the defendants, including NIR.

R.Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5839–41.

Only 25% of the

discretionary costs were assessed against NIR. The costs assessed against NIR were as follows:
(1) $5,176.25 that Valiant incurred for a litigation guarantee identifying all persons with an interest
in the one hundred fifty-six (156) parcels of real property that were foreclosed upon; (2) $601.01 that
Valiant incurred, in excess of the $500.00 allowed as a matter of right, for scanning and copying the
roughly 27,000 pages of documents produced during discovery; (3) $1,453.11 that Valiant incurred
for traveling from Boise to Sandpoint to attend hearings necessitated by NIR’s unsupported motions;
(4) $691.08 that Valiant incurred for postage expenses, courier costs, telephone expenses
and computer assisted research; and (5) $344.23 that Valiant incurred for witness fees in excess of
the $20.00 per day allowed as costs as a matter of right. Id.

3

Id.

4

Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho at 914, 303 P.3d at 601.

5

Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 716, 729–30, 291 P.3d 399, 412–13
(2012).
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NIR does not dispute that Valiant’s discretionary costs were necessary and
reasonably incurred.

NIR instead argues that litigation guarantees, copy/scanning costs,

travel expenses, excess witness fees, and other miscellaneous costs are commonly incurred in
commercial litigation matters and, therefore, an award of said costs constitutes an abuse of discretion
as a matter of law.

In support of its position, NIR cites to several cases in which this

Court determined, under the particular facts and circumstances of said cases, that certain costs were
typical and therefore not exceptional. However, this Court has never held that any cost is so typically
and ordinarily incurred as a matter of law that it cannot be awarded as a discretionary cost in
any case. To the contrary, this Court has emphasized that the determination of whether a cost is
properly awardable as a discretionary cost must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900, 914, 303 P.3d 587, 601 (2013). Under the
facts of this case, the award of discretionary costs to Valiant was appropriate and consistent with
Idaho law.
(1)

The Nature of the Valiant Foreclosure Is Itself Exceptional.

The district court determined that the length, scope and complexity of the Valiant Foreclosure
justified an award of discretionary costs in the interests of justice. R.Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5838–41.
The record amply supports this determination. The Valiant Foreclosure has been litigated since the
Complaint was filed on October 13, 2009. R.Vol. I, p. 172. Thus, the length of this case by itself is
sufficient to justify the district court’s award of discretionary costs. Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho
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at 169, 158 P.3d at 945 (“The district court also found that the costs were in the interests of justice
because of the case’s length and complexity . . . .”).
The scope and complexity of the Valiant Foreclosure are also extraordinary. This case
required the parties to copy and analyze approximately 27,000 pages of real property records and
other documents that were produced during discovery. R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5840. It further required
the district court to adjudicate the priority of the Valiant Mortgages vis a vis the recorded interests of
twenty-eight (28) other parties with respect to one hundred fifty-six (156) parcels of real property
located within The Idaho Club.

See R.Vol. VI, pp. 739–67; R.Vol. XLIV, pp. 5317–5412;

R.Vol. XLV, pp. 5413–5502. This case was vigorously litigated for approximately seven (7) years
before Valiant was awarded a monetary judgment in the amount of $21,485,212.26. R.Vol. XLV,
pp. 5413–16. Thus, the scope and complexity of this case justified the district court’s award of
discretionary costs. Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho at 169, 158 P.3d at 945.
The conduct of the parties also justified the district court’s award of discretionary costs
to Valiant. The district court’s determination was based at least in part upon the conduct of NIR.
The district court’s Memorandum Awarding Costs states, “[a]lthough this [c]ourt has found no
frivolous conduct on the part of the defendants, at several of those hearings, counsel for one or more
defendants presented oral arguments not supported by any legal authority or raised issues and claims
that had already been decided on summary judgment.” R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5840. The district court
further found that:
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[B]ecause Valiant had to defend against multiple motions for
reconsideration by the defendants, some of which contained claims
unsupported by any legal authority or that had already been
determined on summary judgment, the [c]ourt finds certain other
costs were also necessary and exceptional and reasonably incurred,
and in the interest of justice should be assessed against
the defendants.
Id., p. 5841. Thus, the conduct of NIR also made the case exceptional and/or caused an exceptional
amount of costs to be incurred. Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
153 Idaho 716, 729–30, 291 P.3d 399, 412–13 (2012). NIR refused to acknowledge the priority of
the Valiant Mortgages despite: (a) expressly subordinating to the RE Loans Mortgage;
(b) subsequently releasing its purported Vendor’s Lien in its entirety; and (c) being collaterally
estopped from asserting that NIR is owed anything pursuant to said Lien. R.Vol. XXII, p. 2573;
R.Vol. XXIV, pp. 2872–73. Moreover, NIR filed and argued a motion to reconsider that did not
seek to alter any part of the district court’s decision affecting NIR. R.Vol. XXVI, pp. 3114–32.
Thus, the district court considered the frivolity of the issues presented by NIR and whether NIR’s
conduct resulted in an unnecessary waste of time and/or caused Valiant to incur unnecessary costs
that could have been easily avoided. Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho at 914 303 P.3d at 601.
The conduct of NIR justified an award of discretionary costs to Valiant.
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(2)

Valiant’s Discretionary Costs Were Incurred Because the
Case Is Exceptional.

The district court awarded Valiant discretionary costs that were incurred because the nature
of the case was itself exceptional. Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 314,
109 P.3d at 168. The award of these costs was not an abuse of discretion and should not
be overturned.
The litigation guarantee is a necessary cost that Valiant reasonably incurred because of the
exceptional size, scope and complexity of the real property issues in this case. As repeatedly
emphasized herein, this case involves the foreclosure of one hundred fifty-six (156) parcels of
real property. R.Vol. XLIV, pp. 5317–5412; R.Vol. XLV, pp. 5413–5502. Moreover, no less than
twenty-nine (29) parties, including Valiant, asserted a purported interest in all or a portion of
these parcels. R.Vol. VI, pp. 739–67. Six (6) of the parcels are at least twenty (20) acres each,
such that they comprise an area that is at least one hundred twenty (120) acres. R.Vol. LXIII,
p. 7717. The remaining one hundred fifty (150) parcels are, for the most part, platted building lots
with tax parcel identification numbers assigned by the Bonner County Assessor. Id., pp. 7715-7745.
Thus, the real property foreclosed by Valiant easily exceeds two hundred (200) acres. In order to
foreclose upon the Valiant Mortgages, Valiant had to identify the real property that remained unsold
or otherwise unreleased from the Valiant Mortgages, as well as every person or entity that had
asserted an interest in these unreleased/unsold parcels. Valiant incurred necessary and exceptional
expenses in the amount of $20,705.00 to obtain a litigation guarantee that included this information.
R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5839. A litigation guarantee is not necessary in a typical foreclosure case as this
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information can be obtained by a simple title search.

Valiant incurred the costs of a

litigation guarantee only because of the exceptional size, scope and complexity of the real property
at issue. Moreover, only three parties contested the priority of the Valiant Mortgages. By contesting
priority, NIR knew that it was susceptible to an award of the costs as a matter of right and the
discretionary costs Valiant incurred in this case. The district court ordered that NIR was responsible
to pay twenty-five percent (25%) of the cost Valiant incurred to obtain the litigation guarantee.
This determination was not an abuse of discretion and should not be overturned.
The excess scanning costs Valiant was awarded are necessary costs, reasonably incurred
because of the exceptional size, scope and complexity of the real property issues in this case.
Over 27,000 pages of documents were produced in discovery because of the number of parties and
parcels of real property that were the subject of the Valiant Foreclosure. R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5840.
A typical foreclosure case does not involve anywhere near this many documents. Valiant incurred
$1,803.03 in excess copy costs to scan/copy, exhibit stamp and code these documents.
R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5839. These excess copy costs were only incurred because of the exceptional size,
scope and complexity of the real property at issue.

By contesting the priority of the

Valiant Mortgages, NIR knew that it was susceptible to an award of the discretionary costs Valiant
incurred in this case. The district court ordered that NIR was responsible to pay twenty-five percent
(25%) of the excess copy costs Valiant incurred. This determination was not an abuse of discretion
and should not be overturned.
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The travel costs Valiant was awarded are necessary costs, reasonably incurred because of the
largely unsupported motions filed and argued by NIR in this case. NIR contested the priority of the
Valiant Mortgages even though it had no factual or legal bases to do so. NIR expressly subordinated
its Vendor’s Lien to the RE Loans Mortgage. R.Vol. XXII, pp. 2572–74. NIR thereafter released
said Vendor’s Lien in its entirety. Id. Moreover, another district court had already adjudicated that
the Vendor’s Lien had been fully satisfied, such that NIR was collaterally estopped from asserting
that its alleged Vendor’s Lien had priority over the Valiant Mortgages.

Id.; R.Vol. XXIV,

pp. 2871-73. Nonetheless, Valiant incurred costs in the amount of $5,815.42 traveling from Boise,
Idaho to Sandpoint, Idaho to argue at hearings in opposition to defendants’ unsupported motions.
R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5839. The district court determined that it was necessary for Valiant to attend
these hearings in person and not by telephone. Id., p. 5840. The district court ordered that NIR was
responsible to pay twenty-five percent (25%) of Valiant’s travel expenses because they were incurred
due to NIR’s unsupported motions and arguments. Id. These are unnecessary costs that could easily
have been avoided if NIR had not continued to contest the priority of the Valiant Mortgages without
any factual or legal bases to do so. Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho at 914, 303 P.3d at 601.
The district court’s award of these costs to Valiant was not an abuse of discretion and it should not
be overturned.
Valiant incurred miscellaneous litigation costs for postage expenses, courier costs,
telephone expenses and computer assisted research totaling $2,764.32. The district court determined
that Valiant was entitled to an award of a portion of these costs incurred because of NIR’s
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unsupported motions and arguments. R.Vol. XLVIII, p. 5841. As set forth hereinabove, this award
was not an abuse of discretion and should not be overturned.
Valiant incurred witness fees in excess of the $20.00 allowed as costs as a matter of right.
These excess costs totaled $1,376.93. The district court ordered NIR to pay twenty-five percent
(25%) of these costs because of the size, scope and complexity of this case. Id., p. 5840. As set
forth hereinabove, this award was not an abuse of discretion and should not be overturned.
C.

The District Court Properly Awarded Valiant Costs As A Matter Of Right.
NIR asserts that the district court abused its discretion by awarding Valiant certain costs as a

matter of right. This assertion should be rejected.
Rule 54(d)(1)(A) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure entitles the prevailing party to recover
certain costs incurred as a matter of right. Moreover, Rule 54(d)(1)(B) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that the trial court “may apportion the costs between and among the parties
in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in
the action . . . .” The costs that the prevailing party is entitled to recover as a matter of right are
set forth in Rule 54(d)(1)(C) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
NIR does not contend that any of the costs that Valiant was awarded as a matter of right are
costs that are not awardable as such under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. To the contrary,
NIR only contends that the costs that Valiant was awarded are not awardable against NIR.
However, NIR does not cite to any case law, statute, treatise or other legal authority to support
its position. NIR does not cite to the record, court transcript or otherwise identify the factual bases
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for its assignment of error by the district court. Nor does NIR make any effort to explain or
otherwise set forth a cogent argument as to why or how the district court abused its discretion or
acted in a manner inconsistent with Idaho law.
Rule 35(a)(6) of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides that an appellant’s argument
“shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal,
the reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record
relied upon.” Id. The Idaho Supreme Court will not consider an issue not “supported by argument
and authority in the opening brief.” Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 323,
297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (2013). Moreover, “if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported
by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered.” Id. “A general attack on the findings
and conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors,
is insufficient to preserve an issue.” Id. The Idaho Supreme Court does not search the record on
appeal for error. Id. “To the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in
compliance with the Idaho Appellate Rules, it is deemed to be waived.” Id.
NIR has failed to cite to the record or any legal citation to support its contention that the
district court abused its discretion in ordering NIR pay Valiant twenty-five percent (25%) of the costs
that it incurred as a matter of right. As such, NIR has waived any argument that the district court
abused its discretion in awarding said costs to Valiant.
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D.

Attorneys’ Fees On Appeal.
Valiant requests attorneys’ fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121 and the corresponding

procedural mechanism, Idaho Appellate Rule 41, because NIR’s appeal was brought frivolously,
unreasonably and without foundation. Idaho Code § 12-121 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to
the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation.
Idaho Code § 12-121.
An award of attorneys’ fees to Valiant is supported by: (1) Lower Payette Ditch Company v.
Harvey, 152 Idaho 291, 271 P.3d 689 (2012); (2) Wechsler v. Wechsler, No. 44297
(Idaho December 6, 2017); and (3) Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Lower Payette Ditch Company presented this Court with one issue on appeal: Whether the
district court abused its discretion by refusing to award attorneys’ fees under Idaho Code § 12-121
because neither party had prevailed. 152 Idaho at 295, 271 P.3d at 693. The Harveys, who had
requested attorneys’ fees below, appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees, and this Court affirmed the
district court’s discretionary decision. Id. This Court concluded that the Harveys’ assertions on
appeal were proven false by: (1) simply reading the record; and (2) relevant case law. Id.
Lastly, and most importantly, this Court awarded the ditch company attorneys’ fees on appeal
under Idaho Code § 12-121 after finding that the Harveys “simply asked us to second-guess the
district court’s exercise of discretion without presenting any reasoned argument from which we could
conclude that the district court abused its discretion.” Id. at 297, 271 P.3d at 695.
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Similar to the Harveys’ appeal in Lower Payette Ditch Company, NIR’s appeal lacks any
reasoned argument and merely asks this Court to second-guess the district court’s exercise
of discretion. There are two specific similarities between the Harveys’ appeal and NIR’s appeal.
First, in both appeals, the appellants’ arguments were refuted by “simply reading” the record.
For example, in Lower Payette Ditch Company, this Court stated that the Harveys’ argument—that
the ditch company did not recover any relief in the litigation—was proven false by “[s]imply reading
the provisions of the settlement.” Id. at 296, 271 P.3d at 694. Similarly, NIR’s argument—
the district court’s award was an abuse of discretion—is proven false by the Memorandum
Awarding Costs, wherein the district court demonstrated that it: (1) perceived the decision
as discretionary; (2) acted consistent with the applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision
through an exercise of reason by recognizing the overall complexity of the action. R.Vol. XLVIII,
p. 5829–43.
Second, in both appeals, the appellants’ arguments were undermined by relevant case law.
For example, in Lower Payette Ditch Company, this Court stated that the Harveys’ argument was
clearly refuted by case law. Id. at 296, 271 P.3d at 694 (citing Collins v. Jones, 131 Idaho 556, 559,
961 P.2d 647, 650 (1998)). Similarly, NIR’s argument—that certain costs did not qualify as
discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)(1)(D)—is refuted by this Court’s holding in Hayden Lake Fire
Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005) (“This Court has always
construed the requirement that a cost be ‘exceptional’ under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) to include those
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costs incurred because the nature of the case was itself exceptional.”), overruled on other grounds by
Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 152 Idaho 495, 497, 272 P.3d 467, 469 (2012).
In Wechsler v. Wechsler, this Court awarded attorneys’ fees under Idaho Code § 12-121
because “[t]he facts and procedural nature of this case support[ed] Sharon’s contention that
Norman’s sole purpose was to cause her to incur additional legal fees and to prolong this litigation to
evade collection of the judgments against him. Norman’s appeal amounts to nothing more than
continued delay and evasive action.” No. 44297 at *23 (Idaho December 6, 2017). Similarly,
NIR’s appeal of the award of costs, which are minuscule when compared to the overall value of the
disputed property, is merely an attempt to prolong this litigation. Practically speaking, so long as the
disputed property is subject to a pending legal claim (even an appeal of costs), NIR’s Vendor’s Lien
continues to encumber the real property it describes. It appears that NIR is aware of this fact and is
seeking to hamstring Valiant by appealing the award of costs.
Lastly, NIR’s appeal is unreasonable in light of its failure to file a timely objection to
Valiant’s memorandum of costs, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
In sum, in the event that Valiant prevails on appeal, Valiant requests attorneys’ fees on appeal under
Idaho Code § 12-121 because NIR’s appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably and
without foundation.
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V.
CONCLUSION
NIR has failed to establish that the district court’s award of discretionary costs to Valiant was
an abuse of discretion. The bases in law and fact, and the record herein all evidence that the
district court: (1) understood and perceived its award of discretionary costs to Valiant as a matter
of discretion; (2) established that said costs were exceptional and should be awarded to Valiant in the
interests of justice; and (3) reached its determination through an exercise of reason.
NIR’s arguments are without merit and should be rejected, and Valiant should be awarded
attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of January 2018.
McCONNELL WAGNER SYKES & STACEY PLLC

By:

/s/ Richard L. Stacey
Richard L. Stacey, Attorneys For
Cross-Claimant/Respondent
Valiant Idaho, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of January 2018, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served by the method indicated below upon the following party(ies):
Susan P. Weeks, Esq.
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d’Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: 208.667.0683
Facsimile: 208.664.1684
Counsel For VP Incorporated/North Idaho Resorts
Gary A. Finney, Esq.
John A. Finney, Esq.
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: 208.263.7712
Facsimile: 208.263.8211
Counsel For J.V., LLC

[  ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Overnight Mail
[  ] Electronic Mail
sweeks@jvwlaw.net
[  ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Overnight Mail
[  ] Electronic Mail
garyfinney@finneylaw.net
johnfinney@finneylaw.net

/s/ Richard L. Stacey
Richard L. Stacey
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN Al~ FOR THE COL~TY OF BONNER
GENESIS GOLF BlJILDERS, lt~C., formerly
known as NATIONAL GOLF BUILDERS,
INC., a Nevada corporation,

)
)

)

CASE NO. CV-2009-0001810

)

Plaintiff,

v.

) i\-'IEl\.10:RMlf1)lJM DECISION
) ORDER A '\iVARD ING COSTS
) Al~"D ATTOR.J."'fEYS' FEES TO
) V ALLi\..~T IDAHO, LLC

PE~'D OREILLE BOM'-,""ER DK\lELOPlVIENT, )
LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, et al, )
Defendants.

)
)
)

Ai1'1'D RELATED COUNTER, CROSS A.1"i'D
THIRD PARTY ACTIONS PRK\lIOUSLY
FILED HEREIN

)
)
)

THIS ~fATTER came before the Court on August 17, 2016, for a hearing on Valiant
Idaho, LLC's Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees and the objections thereto. Valiant
Idaho, LLC ("Valiant'') is represented by Richard L. Stacey, of MCCONNELL WAGNER
SYKES & STACEY, PLLC. JV, LLC ("JV") is represented by Gary A. Fmney, of FOOfEY
Flli'NEY & FINNEY, P.A. North Idaho Resorts, LLC ('~NIR ') and v'P, Incorporated ('"VP") are
represented by Susan P. Weeks, and David M. Keyes, of JAl\tIES, VERl 0 1 & Vr'EEKS, P.A.

rv, NIR and \lP are referred to collectively herein as '"defendants."
1\IIEMORANDUM DECISION A..'ID ORDER - 1

EXHIBIT A
5829

NOW, THEREFORE, upon consideration, and pursuant to Rule 54(d)(6) and (e)(7) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court hereby settles the dollar amount of the costs and
attorneys' fees to be awarded to Valiant in this Memorandum Decision and Order.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This leng"Jiy lawsuit has t"wo parts: Tne fust part is referred to herein as the "Genesis

Suit." T'.a.e defendants named in the Genesis Suit included RE Loans, LLC, Pensco Trust Co.,
Mortgage Fund '08, LLC (collectively, "'Idaho Club Lenders"), and others. Genesis' complaint
sought to foreclose a mechanic's

lien it recorded to secure amounts it was allegedly owed for

work performed in the construction of the Idaho Club golf course.
counterclaims were alleged by several defendants.

Cross-claims and

The Idaho Chili Lenders successfully

defended the priority of their respective Mortgages against all of these claims and cross-claims.
The second part is referred to herein as the "Valiant Foreclosure." On August 19, 2014,
Valiant amended its Answer in the Genesis Suit to include cross-claims and a Third Party
Complaint to establish the amounts Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC C'POBD") owed to
the Idaho Club Lenders a..7.d to foreclose the 2007 RE Loans Mortgage, the Pensco Mortgage,
and l\11P08 -Nlortgage (collectively, ,_..Valiant Mortgages") to recover these amounts. After
multiple summary judgments, several motions to reconsider, and a bi:fi.rrcated four (4) day bench
trial, this Court determined that the V al:iant l f rtgages are valid first, second and/or third priority
liens recorded against the Idaho Club Property; it awarded Valiant a Judgment in the amount of
$21,485,212.26 1 against POBD; and it awarded Valiant a Decree of Foreclosure entitling Valiant
to sell the Idaho Club Property to recover the amounts V alia..'1.t is owed pursuant to t.lie Judgment.
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IL DISCUSSION
A. Valiant is the Prevailing Party in This Case.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l) provides, in part:
(B) Prevaili.-"Jg Partv.. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing
party and entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound discretion,
consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties. The trial court may determine that a party to an
action prevailed in part and did not prevail in pa.:'i, and on so finding may
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner
after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the
resulting judgment or judgments obtained.
I.R.C.P. 54{d)(l)(B). (Emphasis supplied).

Valiant prevailed on all of its claims, and in defending itself against all of the crossclaims and affirmative defenses raised by JV, ~lR and ·vp in this case. The Valiant .Mortgages
were adjudicated. to be first, second and/or third priority liens recorded against the Idaho Club
Property. Valiant obtained a Judgment in the amount of $21,485,212.262 against POBD a..'1.d a
Decree of Foreclorure entitling it to sell the Idaho Club Property to pay the Judgment. Tne
claims and affirmative defenses of JV, NIR. and

·vp were rejected. Accordingly, this Court, in

the exercise of its discretion, finds that Valiant is t.'le prevailing pa..rty in this action.
This prevailing party analysis is unique to thls case, and does not necessarily apply to the
other Idaho Club Lawsuits described in Valiant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees.

See Valiant Idaho, LLC's lvfemorandum ofCosts and Attorneys' Fees (filed July 6, 2016), at 2-5.
Consequently, this Court does not interpret Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 as authorizing an
award to Valiant in this case of the fees and costs it incmred in the other Idaho Club Lawsui..s.

1

plus post-judgment interest at the rate of 5.625% per annum.

z ibid.
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B. Valiant Is Entitled To A.n Award of Costs and Attorneys' Fees Against POBD
Pursuant to the Valiant l\'Iortgages.

1. ]Ras-is fer the Awarrl
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e) provides, in part:
(1) P1.n;s.nant to Contract er S-tam:te. In any civil action the court may award
reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or
parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l )(B), when provided for by any statute or
contract.
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). (Emphasis supplied).
Under the rerms of the Valiant Mortgages, Valiant is entitled to an award of its legal
expenses, including cou...'1: costs and reasonable attorneys' fees that it in.cu._rred in the foreclosure

action against POBD. Each of the Valiant !vfortgages has language entitling it to recover these
fees and costs from POBD, and also, securing POBD's obligation to pay t.½.ese fees and costs.

Specifically, paragraph 4.9 of the 2007 RE Loans Mortgage (Plaintiff's Ex. 1), Pensco
Mortgage (Piaintift' s Ex. 16), and 1-fF 08 Mortgage (PlaiI1.tiff' s Ex. 18) provides:
The prevailing party in any legal action brought by one party against the
other and arising out of this :Mortgage or the Note shall be entitled to, in
addition to any other rights and remedies he may have, to reimbursement for
their expenses including court costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Id. (Emphasis supplied). This provision obligates POBD to reimburse Valiant for all reasonable
attorneys' fees and court costs it incurs in the Valiant Foreclosure.
:Moreover, each of the Valia.11t Mortgages grants Valiant said mortgage "TO F..A\7E

A.J.'IT)

TO HOLD the Mortgaged Property for the purposes and uses herein expressed and FOR THE
PURPOSE OF SEClJRThTG, in s-uch order of priority as Mortgagee may elect: ... 2. Due,

prompt, and complete observance, performance, and discharge of all obligations of the
~fortgagor under this Mortgage and any and all modifications, extensions or renewals of this

r.A:ortgage." Plaintiff's Ex. 1, pp. 3-4, Plaintiffs Ex. 16, pp. 3-4, and Plaintiff's Ex. 18, pp. 3-4

MEMOR,\..~UM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

5832

( emphasis in original). Thus, POBD' s obligation to pay Valiant' s expenses, including court costs
and reasonable attorneys' fees, is also secured by the Valiant :Mortgages.
The secured obligations extend beyond those obligations set fort.h in paragraph 4.9 of the
Valiant Mortgages. POBD is also obligated to forever warrant and defend the priority of
Valiant' s interest in and title to the Idaho Club Property against any and all lien claims made by
third parties. See paragraph 1.2 of the Valiant Mortgages, at Plaintiff's Ex. 1, p. 5, Plaintiffs Ex.
16, p. 5, and Plaintiff's Ex. 18, p. 7. POBD must "'pay or reimburse Mortgagee for all reasonable
expenses incurred by lvfortgagor before fu--id after the date of this Mortgage with respect to any
an.d all actions, matters or transactions arising out of or related to the tbis Mortgage."

Paragraph4.4 of the Valiant ~lortgages, at Plain.tiff' s Ex. 1, p. 15, Plaintiff's Ex. 16, p. 15, and
Plaintiff's Ex. 18, p. 17 (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, POBD is also obligated to 'indemnify

and hold ha..-rmless the Mortgagee from and against all claims, damages~ losses and liabilities
(including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses) arising out of or based

upon ally matter related to the i\'1ortgaged Property and the occupancy, ownership,
maintenance, or management of the :Mortgaged Property by the lVIortgagor." Paragraph 4.5

of the Valiant

fortgages, at Plaintiffs Ex. 1, p. 15, Plaintiff's Ex. 16, pp. 15-16, and Plaintiff's

Ex. 18, p. 17 (emphasis supplied). These provisions obligate POBD to reimburse Valiant for all
reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs it incurred in the Genesis Suit.
Since all of the obligations of POBD are secured by the Valiant Mortgages, all expenses,
including

reasonable

attorneys'

fees

and

costs,

inctnTed

by

Valiant

and

its

predecessors-in-interest in this case are secured by the Valiant Mortgages.
fo. sum, as the prevailing party, Valiant is entitled to an award of attorneys ' fees and costs

against POBD under the terms of the Valiant Mortgages.

POBD is obligated under the
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Mortgages to reimburse Valiant for these fees and costs, and this obligation is secured by the
Valiant !vfortgages. Hence, this secured obligation is prior in right, title and interest to any
interest possessed by N, 1',;'IR or N. Accordingly, Valiant's award of attorneys' fees and costs
against POBD shall be incorporated into the Judgment as part of Valiant' s first priority position
pursuant to the 2007 RE Loans Mortgage.
2. Amount of the A ward
Upon consideration of the Declaration of Richard L. Stacey in Support of Valiant Idaho's

LLC's 1\-femorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees, filed

July 6, 2016 (hereafter, "Stacey

Dec."), and Valiant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees, tbis Cou.."1: finds reasonable,
and awards against POBD, the following costs and fees:
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Total Attorneys' Fees
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J
-

Actual fees
for service of
pleadings or
documents
[see Stacey
Dec.. Ex. G4]

582,329,84

The actual fees for service of pleadings or documents are being assessed against POBD
instead of N , VP and NIR because Exhibit G-4 of the Stacey Dec. does not include any invoices
for service on JV, VP or NI..~ and the defem:f~ts shall not be required to reimburse Valiant for
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service on the numerous other parties in this matter.

To avoid duplicate cost awards, and

because POBD did not defend against the Valiant Foreclosure or participate adversely to Valiant
at trial, the Court shall assess fae remaining costs as a matter of right and discretionary costs
i--icurred by Valiant in the Valiant Foreclosure agai.'1St N, VP and NIR, and not against POBD.
Accorclin!!lv. Valiant is aw::arded attornevs' fees and costs a2ainst POBD in the total
amount of ($148.945.64 + $582.329.84) = $731,275.48, This amount shall be incoroorated into

the Jud2:ment as

!Dart

0.i v alia.nt s.mst prioritv positioap.msuant to the 2tl07 RE Loans wfurrga.£!:e.

*****
Because attorneys' fees and costs have been awarded to Valia.t7.t under the terms of the
Valifu""'lt Mortgages, it is unnecessary to conduct a fee analysis under Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

C. Valiant Is Not Entitled To An Award of Attorn-eys' Fees Against JV, 1'1--rR and v-P.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) provides, in part:
(2) Pmm.la:n to Eda.ho. C©de Section 12- l 2!. Attorney fees under Idaho Code
Section 12-121 may be awarded by the court only when it finds that the case
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation, which finding must be in writing and include the basis and
reasons for the award. No attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 12-121 on a default judgment.

LR.C.P. 54(e)(2). (Emphasis supplied).
"An award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Idaho 1vlilitary Historical Sociery, Inc. v. Maslen, 156
Idaho 624,629,329 P.3d 1072, 1077 (2014) (citation omitted).
Similarly, "[t]he district court's determination as to whether an action was broug,.1.t or
defended frivolously will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Id (citation omitted).
In Narnpa & Jrferidian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington. Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702

(2001), the Idaho Supreme Court set forth the standard for making this determination:
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This Court has held that an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 is not
a matter of right, and is appropriate only when the Court, in its discretion,
"is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or
brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Owner-Operator
Ind Drivers Assoc. v. Idaho Public U.til. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 401 , 408, 871 P2d
818, 825 (1994). Wllen deciding whether the case was brought or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the
litigation must be taken into account. Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable
issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 even
though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation. See Turner v. Willis, 119 Idaho 1023, 812
P.2d 737 (1 991). The award of attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court and the burden is on the person disputing the award to show an abuse of
discretion. See A nderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982).
Id. at 524-525, 20 P.3d at 708-709. (Emphasis supplied).

Recently, in Idaho lvfilitary Historical Sociery, Inc. v. Maslen, su:pra, the Supreme Court
attempted to clarify its ruling in Nampa & .Nferidian Irrigation Dist. , as follows:
Unfortunately, the standard articulated in Nampa i'Jtferidian can lead
to the result that a party who makes claims or defenses that are clearly
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation may avoid the consequences
of that conduct and cast the burden of attorney fees on the other party, even
if the overall '\liew of the case establishes the unreasonableness of the conduct
requiring the lawsuit. Arguably, a single, triable issue of fact may excuse a party
from the aggregate of misconduct that necessitates or dominates the conduct of
the lawsuit. This Court does back away from and clarify the overly strict
application of Idaho Code section 12-121 set forth in Nampa Meridian.
Apportionment of attorney fees is appropriate for those elements of the case
that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. Apportionment of
costs and fees is common even for district courts, and this step back from the
language of Nampa J.\lfer idian is consistent with the general principles of
apportioning costs and fees.

The record in this case is clear that litigation to obtain possession of the
aircraft should never have been necessary. The litigation was necessitated by
factual claims that were indefensible. The Plaintiff asserted some legal
theories it could not prove. Those assertions were in response to factual
claims by the Defendants that were unsupportable and which were known by·
the Defendants to be unsupportable. The Defendants had no legitimate
triable cfaims of fact on the question that necessitated the initiation of this
action. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the attorney fees
for the ciaims of tb.e Defendants necessitating this lawsuit that were frivolous,
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unreasonable, and without adequate foundation.
156 Idaho 624, 632, 329 P.3d 1072, 1080 (2014). (Emphasis supplied).
Comparing the conduct of the defendants in this case with the conduct the district court
found frivolous in Idaho }.1Blitary Historical Society, Inc., this Court finds as follows: In the

Valiant Foreclosure, all the defendants asserted some legal theories they could not prove. One or
more of the defendants made some factual claims that were unsupportable. The Court does not
find that those claims v,,rere known by the defendants to be unsupportable. The issue at trialnamely, whether Loan No. P0099 from RE Loans to POBD and Loan No. P0106 from Pensco
Co. to POBD were satisfied at the closing of Loan No. P0106 from .Y.[F08 to POBD, or some

time thereafter-arose out of a legitimate factual claim by the defl:ndants that the loans had been
satisfied.

The trial resulted in the production by Valiant of evidence that clearly and

convincingly showed that the loans were not satisfied, and the amounts still due thereu..'1.der.

Though some of the claims and defenses raised by rv, ITR and VP lacked any factual or
legal basis, viewing the entire course of the litigation, this Court does not believe that Tv, NIR or

VP defended this action frivolously, lnrreasonably, or without foundation. Absent such frivolous

or unreasonable condu~ Valiant is not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees against them.
D. Valiant is En-titled to Costs as a J\'Iatter of Right Against Jv~, l'l""IR and VP.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)( 1) provides, in part:

(d) Costs.
(1) In General; Items Allowed

(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs
are allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless
otherwise ordered by the court.
(C) Costs as a Matter of Right. Wnen costs are awarded to a party, that party is
entitled to the following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right: ...

LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(A), (C). (Emphasis supplied)_
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Rule 54{d)(l )(A) and (C) of the Ida.ho Rules of Civil Procedure grant the prevailing party

in a civil matter certain costs "as a matter of right." Valiant prevailed in the Valiant Foreclosure
against the claims and affirmative defenses raised by N, NIR and VP in motion practice and at
trial. As sue~ Valiant is entitled to an award of these costs. Valiant's 1\-!emorandum of Costs

and Attorneys' Fees and the Stacey Dec. itemize the costs incurred by Valiant that are expressly

authorized under Rule 54(d)(l)(C). These include certain court filing fees, service of process
fees, deposition and transcript fees, witness fees, witness travel expenses, preparation of trial
exhibits, and expert witness fees that V alian.t incurred in this case.
Upon consideration, this Court finds reasonable the following costs as a matter of right:

a.

Court Filing Fees
[see Stacey Dec.:, Exs. A-2, G-21

b.

Witness fees (S20.00 per day; $.30 mileag-e) actually paid for
each day the following witnesses testified at deposition or at
trial
Casey Linscott TriaJ - $20.30
Barney Ng
Trial - $20.00
[see Stacey Dec., Ex. G-51

$

86.00

$

20.30

c.

Expenses of certified copies of documents admitted as
evidence in hearings or at trial {see Stacey Dec., Ex G-5]

$

158.50

d.

Costs of preparing models, maps, pictures, photographs, or
other exhibits not to exceed $500.00 for each party [see Stacey
Dec., Ex G-5/StreamlineJ

$

500.00

e.

Charges for reporting and transcribing all depositions and
charges for one copy of every deposition taken
{see Stacey Dec., Ex D-2, Ex G-6]

$

8,250.19

E. Valiant is Entitled to an Award of Discretionary Costs Against JV, NIR and VP.
Rule 54(d)(l )(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes this Court to award the
prevailing party "[a]dditional items of cost not enumerated~ or in an amount L11 excess of that
listed in subpart (C), . . . on a sho"'Ni.ng that foe costs were necessary and exceptional costs,
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reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse
party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) (emphasis supplied).

award of its discretionary costs against N,

As the prevailing party, Valiant seeks an

v'P and NIR. as itemized in Valiant's Nlemorandum

of Costs and Attorneys' Fees and the Stacey Dec. The defendants have filed objections thereto.
Upon consideration, this Court finds necessary and ex eptional and reasonably incurred
the following discretionary costs:

a.

Litigation Guarantee for foreclosure actioo
fsee Stacey Dec., Ex. G-12J

$

20,705.00

a.

Wttness fees aclnaJly incurred in excess of the $20.00 per
witness per day allowed as a. matter of right
fsee Stacey Dec., Ex G-11 - Barney NgJ

s

1,376.93

b.

Costs of scanning, exhibit stamping, <:opying, and coding and
preparing models, maps, pictures, photographs, or other
exhibits for use at trial in excess of the $500.00 per party
allowed as a matter of right
{see Stacey Dec.~ Ex. G-10]

$

588.55

C.

Electronic discovery costs for documents not used as exhibits
at trial [see Stacey Dec., Ex. A-3J

$

182.61

d.

In-House photocopy expenses {see Stacey Dec., Ex. A-3]

$

351.30

e.

Out-sourced p.hotocopy expenses, and costs of copies
reimbursed to third parties [see stacey Dec., Exs. A-3, G-10]

$

680.57

f.

Postage
FedEx
Couriers:

$

653.oS

$ 76.86 [see Stacey Dec., Ex. G- 7J
$ 532.82 [see Stacey Dec., Exs. A-3, G-7]

S 44.00 [see Stacey Dec., Ex G-8]

g.

Long distance telephone and conference call charges
{see Stacey Dec., Exs. A-3~ G-9]

$

239.58

h.

. Travel expenses for counsel [see Stacey Dec., Ex. G-11]

$

5,815.42

$

1,871.06

i.

Computer-assisted research {see Stru:ey Dec., Exs. A-2, G-2]

The Court finds that the scope and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary and
exceptional costs which Valiant should be awarded in the interests of justice, because these are
costs which Valiant had to expend to fully litigate this matter but which are not contemplated by
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the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as costs as a matter of right. Specifically:
1. The witness fees Valiant paid in excess of the $20.00 per day were necessary and

exceptional, reasonably incu..-rred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed agairu,i:
the defendants
2. This case required the scanning and copying of thousands of pages of documents. tvfr.
Stacey estimates that approximately 27,000 documents were produced in discover;;
nearly 200 documents were scanned into exhibits for trial; and hard copies of all exhibits
were required for the witnesses and record at trial. These costs were necessary and
exceptional, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against
the defendants.
3. In order to ensure that every person or entity w ·

an int rest in the Idaho Club Property

was named as a defendant in t.½e Valiant Foreclosure, Valiant obtained and paid for a
Litigation Guai.antee. This Litigation Guarantee was critical to the foreclosure action, and
the Court finds that it was a necessai.--y and exceptional cos~ reasonably incurred, and
should in foe interest of justice be assessed against the defendants.
4. Counsel for Valiant is located in Boise, Idaho.

Valiant incuned significant travel

expenses to and from the multiple hea.T1I1gs that were necessary in the Valiai.7.t
Foreclosure_

Although this Court has found no frivolous conduct on the part of the

defendants, .at several of those hearings, counsel for one or more of the defendants
presented oral arguments not supported by a.."ly legal authority or raised issues and claims
that had already been determined on summary judgment. Because of the complexity of
the case, it was necessary for counsel to appear in person and not by telephone.

Thus,

the Court finds these travel costs were necessary and exceptional, reasonably incurred,
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and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the defendants.
5. Similarly, because Valiai1.t had to defend against multiple motions for reconsideration by
the defendants, some of which contained claims unsupported by any legal authority or
that had already been determined on summary judgment, the Cou..rt finds certain other
cost..s were also necessary and exceptional and reasonably incurred, and in the interest of
justice should be assessed against the defendants. They include Valiant's (i) outsourced
photocopy

expenses;

(ii) in-house

photocopy

expenses;

(iii) postage

expenses;

(iv; courier costs; ( v) telephone expenses; and (vi) cost of computer-assisted research.

Based on the fure.2:oing_ Valiant is an awarded costs a.!2:amst N . Y-P and N1R iB the total

amount of {$9.014.99 + $32.464.70) = $41.479.69.
F. App-0rtionment of Award of Costs Betiveen JV, ~"'IR and VP.
Tne Cou..-rt is authorized by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 to apportion costs between
the defendants. Recognizing that N1R pazticipated in pre- and post-trial motion practice, but not
in the court trial, this Court apportions the costs as follows:
L NIR. is responsible for 0.25 of $41,479.69 = $10,369.93 3
2. JV is respons·ble for 0.375 of$41,479.69

= $15,554.88

3. VP is responsible for 0.375 of $41,479.69

= $15,554.88

ID. CONCLUSION A,,1'© ORDER

NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Valiant is avvarded attorn ys' fees and costs against POBD in the total amount of
$73i,275.48.

This amount shall be incorporated into the Judgment as part of
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Valiant' s first priority position pursuant to t.1.e 2007 RE Loans Mortgage.

2. Valiant is awarded costs against NIR in the amount of $10,369.93
3. Valiant is awarded costs against JV in the amount of $15,554.88
4. Valiant is awarded costs against VP in the amount of $15,554.88

ITIS SO ORDERED.
DATED tJ,is 22-ciaY of August, 2016.

"

/ '

Barbara Buchanan
District Judge

3

The exact value is $1 iJ ,369. 92, but 1he Court has added $.01 to this value to take into account the rounding of the
numbers and to ensure that the contribu:tioas from each defendanr, added together, total $41,479.69.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certiry that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid
A."ND a courtesy copies sent by electronic mail, this J. J.. day of August, 2016, to:

Gary A. Finney
FINNEY FINNnY & FINNEY, PA
120 East Lake Street, Suite 31 7
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864
Facsimile: 208.263.8211
finneylaw@fillneylaw.net
(Attorneys for For JV., LLC)
Susan P. Weeks
Daniel l\.-f. Keyes
JANIBS, VER1 ON & VlEEKS, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Facsimile: 208.664.1684
sweeks@jvwJaw..net
dkeyes@jvwlaw.net

(Attorneys for VP, Incorporated/North Idaho Resorts, LLC)
Fichard L. Stacey
Jeff R. Sykes
Chad M. Nicholson
McCONNELL WAG ffiR SYKES
& STACEY, PLLC.
827 East Park Boulevar~ Suite 201
Boise, ID 83712
Facsimile: 208.489.0110
stacey@mwsslawyers.com
sykes@mwsslawyers.com
nichoison@mwssiawyers.com
(Attorney for R.E. Loans, LLC; and Valiant Idaho, LLC)

Deputy Clerk
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STATE OF i· /l. , ·,
C0! 1 'TY F 80 NE '"!

F ... r Ju0tc1.,~L 0 1ST?. c r

2016 AJJG 22 PH 3~ l+ I
CLERK DiSTR!C T CO Llff(

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN M'D FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

GEl'l"ESIS GOLF BlJILDERS, INC., formerly
known as NATIONAL GOLF BUILDERS,
INC., a Nevada corporation,

)
)

)

CASE NO. CV-2009-0001810

)

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)
PEl'i'D OREILLE BONNER DKVELOPl\lIENT, )
LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, et al , )
)
)
Defendants.

.IT,1DG:MENT re:
COSTS AND ATTORl~YS' FEES

v.

)

)

A..~'D RELATED COUNTER, CROSS AND
THlRD PARTY ACTIONS PREVIOUSLY
FILED HEREIN

)
)
)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Valiant Idfu½.o, LLC is awarded costs and attorneys ' fees against Pend Oreille Bonner

Development, LLC, in the amount of $731,275.48. This amount shall be incorporated
into the Judgment as part of Valiant' s first priority position pursuant to the 2007
RE Loans :Mortgage.

2. Valiant Idaho, LLC is awarded costs against North Idaho Resorts, LLC in the amount
of $10,369.93 .
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3. Valiant Idaho, LLC is awarded costs against N, LLC in the amount 0£$15,554.88.
4. Valiant Idaho, LLC is awarded costs against VP, Incorporated in the amount of
$15,554.88.

IT IS SO ORDERED .
DATED this

J '.? day of August, 2016.
Barbara'iiucllanan
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid
A..."I\JD a courtesy copies sent by electronic mail, this J !). day of August, 2016, to:
Gary A. Finney
FINNEY FIN"NEY & FlNNEY, PA
120 East Lake Street, Suite 31 7
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864
Facsimile: 208.263.8211
finneylaw@finneylaw.net
(Attorneys for For JV, LLC)

Susan P. Weeks
Daniel M. Keyes
JAl.v.IES, VERNO & WEEKS, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Facsimile: 208.664.1684
sweeks@jvwlaw.net
dkeyes@jvwlaw.net
(Attorneys for v--P, Incorporatecl/North Idaho Resorts, LLC)
Richard L. Stacey
JeffR. Sykes
Chad M. Nicholson
McCONNELL WAG~"'ERSYKES
& STACEY, PLLC.
827 East Park Boulevard, Suite 201
Boise, ID 83712
Facsimile: 208.489.0110
stacey@mwsslawyers.com
sykes@mwsslawyers.com
nicholson@mwsslawyers.com
(Attorney for R.E. Loans, LLC; and Valiant Idaho; LLC)

Deputy Clerk
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